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Ia s kw h e t h e rd i ﬀerences in labor market performance between the US and Europe can
be attributed to an interaction between employment protection legislation (EPL) and an
acceleration in the rate of capital-embodied technical change associated with the advent of
information technologies.
I ﬁnd that EPL is associated with a slowing in the diﬀusion of new technologies. I also
ﬁnd that an acceleration in the rate of embodied technical change has a negligible eﬀect on
employment in an undistorted economy. In addition, in the presence of EPL, employment
decreases in the long run after such a shock.
JEL Codes: E6, J21, J63, J65, L63, L86, O33, O38
Keywords: embodiment, vintage capital, dismissal costs, employment, information tech-
nology.
1 Introduction
I st h e r eal i n kb e t w e e ne m p l o y m e n tp r o t e c t i o nl e g i s l a t i o n( E P L )a n dt h er a t eo ft e c h n i c a lc h a n g e ?
An extensive literature studies diﬀerences in labor market performance between the US and
Europe in recent decades. Many accounts of these diﬀerences have centered upon diﬀerences
in labor market institutions. A notable contribution is that of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998),
who argue that a combination of job security and unemployment policies could have left many
European economies vulnerable to a period of "turbulence" that arrived in the 1970s and 1980s.
There is an independent literature that studies the nature of capital-embodied technical
change. This literature generally ﬁnds that the rate of embodied technical change accelerated
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1starting in the mid 1970s.1 Other authors have associated this phenomenon, as well as subsequent
asset price and macroeconomic dynamics, with the sudden and wide diﬀusion of Information
Technology2 (IT). For instance, Gordon (1990) and Cummins and Violante (2001) show that IT
is the industry in which embodied technical change proceeds at the fastest pace.
In this paper, I ask whether a contributing factor to the European employment dilemma
could have been an interaction between the acceleration of embodied technical change associated
with the spread of IT on the one hand, and labor market ridigities on the other.
First, I develop a general equilibrium framework that is suited to studying the relationship
between regulation and the vintage distribution. I ﬁnd that, in the model, EPL is associated
with decreases in employment. Moreover, these decreases are larger when capital embodied
technical change is faster. I also ﬁnd that EPL is associated with the somewhat slower diﬀusion
of technology, as reﬂected in the vintage distribution.
An acceleration of embodied technical change has two eﬀects that could interact with dismissal
costs. First, the rate of embodied technical change might be negatively related to the average
scale of production, because productivity and hence optimal plant size decline together at a rate
that depends on the pace of technical change — see Mitchell (2002). A likely consequence of
this is that, in economies where the cost of dismissing workers is high, hiring will be suppressed
as a result of the fact that the optimal ﬁrm size declines faster, and a given job is likely to be
destroyed sooner, when technical change is rapid. I call this the acceleration eﬀect. Second, if all
other fundamentals remain the same, an acceleration in the rate of embodied technical change
may also constitute an increase in "turbulence," increasing the variability of optimal plant size.
Interestingly, I ﬁnd that the quantitative impact of the acceleration eﬀect appears to be more
important than the turbulence eﬀect.
Section 2 introduces the theoretical model. Section 3 characterizes the plant’s problem,
solution, and macroeconomic equilibrium. Section 4 describes the calibration procedure, while
Section 5 studies the relationship between EPL and technical change. Section 6 discusses ﬁndings
and extensions.
2M o d e l E c o n o m y
First, I provide a brief overview of the structure of the model, along with an overview of its
relationship to related frameworks.
The economy is a vintage capital model characterized by ongoing job and establishment
turnover. Reallocation of resources across plants will be a precondition for ongoing growth, so
that the adoption of new capital and the eventual abandonment of the old are essential features.
Reallocation will also be partly due to idiosyncratic factors at the plant-level, reﬂecting the wide
outcome heterogeneity documented among plants that are otherwise observationally equivalent.
Adoption may take place either through investment at old plants or through the creation of new
ones. The model thus contains the minimum of ingredients necessary to address the relationship
1See McHugh and Lane (1987), Greenwood et al (1997), Cummins and Violante (2001) and Samaniego (2004b).
Strictly speaking these papers focus on investment-speciﬁc technical change. In a slight abuse of terminology,
in what follows I use the terms "investment-speciﬁc technical change" and "capital-embodied technical change"
interchangeably.
2See for example Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001).
2between technical diﬀusion and regulation.
The model economy combines elements of Hopenhayn (1990) and Mitchell (2002). The ap-
plied literature on employment protection often uses general equilibrium versions of Hopenhayn
(1992). Mitchell (2002) develops a vintage capital model that is consistent with data on the rate
of technical change and the scale of production. In that model, however, exit is exogenous and
there is no possibility of improving technology at a plant. Instead, I allow for technical change
to occur through "updating" as well as entry. I also endogenize exit in the manner of Samaniego
(2004a). This is necessary for the lifetime of capital to be endogenous. I provide a relatively
brief description of the model: the interested reader is referred to Samaniego (2003) for further
details.
2.1 Establishments
There is a continuum of heterogeneous plants of endogenous mass that course through discrete
time. Plant output is determined partly by the age of its capital, and partly by chance. Heuris-
tically, an existing plant has three decisions to make:
1. how much labor to hire;
2. whether or not to close;
3. whether or not to "update" the technology it is using.
2.1.1 Output
At any point in time t a plant is characterized by the vintage t−τ of the technology it embodies
(hence τ is its age), by an idiosyncratic productivity shock zt ∈ [0,z], and by its labor input nt,








where γD is an exogenous disembodied productivity growth factor and γE is an exogenous embod-
ied productivity growth factor. Parameters γD and γE distinguish between two types of technical
change. Each period, the productivity of all plants in operation improves by a factor γD.O n
the other hand, the productivity of new plants improves by a factor γE also. Existing plants do
not beneﬁt from this latter mode of technological progress, unless they invest in updating their
capital. Idiosyncratic productivity is governed by a Markov process generated by a distribution
f(zt+1|zt).
There is one unit of capital per plant. I concentrate on the extensive rather than the intensive
margin for three main reasons:
1. Most investment occurs in "lumps". With the intensive margin of capital, these lumps
would be timed to coincide with instances of updating, as in Samaniego (2003a).
2. The model isolates the eﬀect of policy through the replacement channel
33. I do not need to address the issue of whether productivity is embodied in capital, or
whether there is a complementarity between capital- and establishment-level embodiment
— see Nelson and Winter (1982). Samaniego (2003b) ﬁnds that taking a stance on one
or the other approach leads to similar values for γE, so this agnosticism is also useful for
purposes of calibration.
Another interpretation of the model is that there is a representative ﬁrm, and that each plant
is in fact a unit of capital used by the ﬁrm. zt then captures how well or badly this unit performs
in a particular period. This interpretation places the model closer to the model of Campbell
(1998) — except that I allow for the possibility of updating.
2.1.2 Updating
At the end of each period, plants have the option of upgrading their capital to any level below the
frontier productivity next period.3 If an establishment desires to attain a level of productivity
π ≤ 1 relative to the frontier, it must incur a cost κπpt. κ is a technological parameter, whereas
pt is the price of an intermediate or "managerial" good. This structure is simple in that the cost
of updating only depends on the target vintage: if the target productivity is γ
t−τ0









Plant closure will be one important reason for the retirement of capital, so that matching shut-
down rates carefully will be important for the calibration procedure. Hence, I require a non-trivial
model of shutdowns.
Every period, establishments are subject to a number of possible, mutually exclusive shocks
aside from their productivity shock. These are uncertain payments that they must make that
are not directly related to productivity itself, and may be thought of as including any ﬁxed costs
of operation as well as other shocks such as legal problems, plant breakdowns, strikes, ﬁres, etc.
I term these "continuation shocks". Payments all involve purchasing an appropriate number of
units of the intermediate good.4
There is a set Φ of possible such payments. Let J be the cardinality of Φ,s ot h a ta n y
particular payment value φj is indexed by j<J , ordered without loss of generality so that
i<j⇐⇒ φi <φ j.W i t he a c hφj I associate a probability λj,w h e r e
P
φj∈Φ λj =1 .T h ec o s ti s
paid in terms of the managerial good. Thus, the inputs used to establish them are the same as
those used to keep them running.
3In principle they may also "downgrade" their capital; however, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that this will
never be optimal.
4The fact that continuation costs as well as the updating cost depend on a price allows the model to exhibit
stationarity, as costs can maintain their magnitude relative to output on a balanced growth path. This obviates
the need to include a ﬁxed cost that increases exogenously. Another option would be, as in Campbell (1998), to
consider an exogenous scrap value per eﬃciency unit of retiring plants. I abstract from scrap values as, in terms
of calibration, scrap values and costs of this type play similar roles, and hence they will not aﬀect results.
Other models either impose exogenous closure or imply that costs such as φ increase exogenously over time.
The former does not account adequately for diﬀerential hazard rates among cohorts. The latter lacks an economic
foundation.
4At the beginning of each period, before the realization of zt, an establishment draws some φj
from Φ,a n dm u s tp a yφjpt in order to continue in operation — where draws are independently
distributed across establishments and over time. Plants whose continuation value is lower than
φjpt may optimally choose to close.
Again, there are many interpretations of the continuation shock. It could represent any of
the aforementioned unforeseen shocks. It could also capture exogenous variations in ﬁnancial
constraints the establishment faces. It could also represent changes in technology, such as "re-
organization shocks" — accumulated organizational capital in the relevant industry may become
obsolete due to qualitative changes in technology that require diﬀerent and unfamiliar methods
for implementation or use, and payments to consultants are necessary for eﬀective continuation.
An advantage to this framework is that it includes many alternative structures as special cases.
For instance, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) assume that there is a per-period cost to remaining
in operation. In the present framework, this is equivalent to setting J =1 ,0 <φ 1 < ∞,λ 1 =1 .
However, this formulation implies counterfactually that exit is highly concentrated among the
youngest establishments.
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) is calibrated to quinquennial data. If the model were annual
or quarterly, the implied diﬀerences between model behavior and the data would be signiﬁcant,
with almost all exit occurring in the ﬁrst period of life. An alternative when using shorter periods
is to impose the exogeneity of establishment exit, as in Veracierto (2001). This is equivalent to
setting J =2 ,φ 1 =0 ,φ 2 = ∞,λ 2 < 1. However, when the endogenous response of plant closure
may be an important determinant of aggregate dynamics, exogeneity eliminates a critical margin.
By setting J ≥ 2 and allowing the various shock values to be determined by the calibration
process enables the allocation of a diﬀering role of shutdowns in job destruction across age
groups. In particular, it may be that φ1 =0so that some plants of all types will be able to
persist, whereas φJ is so costly that no ﬁrm regardless of productivity can survive and, to this
extent, exit is indeed exogenous. To the degree that exit is driven by either of these shocks,
the exit margin will not be directly aﬀected by policy. To the degree that it is driven by other
shocks, it may. I make the assumption henceforth that φJ = ∞.
2.1.4 Newcomers and the Managerial Good
The intermediate managerial good is produced by households, using labor as the only input. It
has three uses: to maintain plants in operation, to generate new plants, and for updating. New
plants begin operations in the period following their inception.
If household i spends mit hours producing the managerial good, the resulting output is given
by a production function ζ(mit). I assume ζ
0 > 0,ζ
00 < 0.
As noted, entering plants adopt the newest vintage when they begin operations5.A t t h a t
point, each receives its initial idiosyncratic shock z from a distribution ψ(z) and must produce
for at least one period. Hence the entry decision is made prior to the revelation of z.
An establishment’s "type" is a pair (τ,zt).L e tµt : R × N → R be the measure over types,
and let Et be the mass of entering plants at date t. The evolution of the measure over types
follows a transition function G,s ot h a tµt+1 = G(µt,E t). G is an equilibrium object in that it
5Endogenous growth extensions of the model that oblige plants to buy their initial capital for a vintage-
contingent price have all plants adopting the frontier technology in equilibrium.
5must be consistent with the various optimal decision rules, satisfying a functional equation that
is described in Appendix C along with an algorithm for its computation.
2.2 Households
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived dynastic households that grow each period by a factor ν.
Preferences over streams of consumption {ct}∞
t=0 and leisure {lt}∞






t [logct + L(lt)]
lt ∈ [0,ω],c t ≥ 0∀t
where ω is their individual time endowment.
Households are involved in several activities. They supply labor to a competitive market, and
spend time creating the managerial good as above, which also trades on a competitive market.
Finally, using the income they derive from the above activities and the assets they already own,
they purchase new assets (plants) and consumption goods. The price of the consumer good
is normalized to equal one in each period. The per-period household recursive problem then
becomes:








ct + ptet ≤ Π(b µt)+wtht + ptζ(mt)
lt = ω − ht − mt
b µt+1 = G(b µt,e t)
where
pt = price of the managerial good
mt = hours spent creating the managerial good
ht = hours spent working
Π(b µt)= income from currently owned assets (plants)
et = purchases of new assets
b µt = the measure of the household’s asset holdings
That people — particularly those with managerial experience — switch between labor markets and
entrepreneurialism is documented in Lazear (2002). Symmetry of ownership across households
is assumed.6 T h ef a c tt h a ta g e n t sm u s tb ei n d i ﬀerent between labor and entrepreneurialism in
equilibrium will play the role of a free-entry condition.
6In any stationary equilibrium, µt =ˆ µt. Symmetry is a natural assumption since, at the time of asset purchase,
a household cannot tell what its realized dividends will be. Moreover, consumer heterogeneity is not the focus of
study.
63 Stationary Equilibrium
As speciﬁed, the economy is non-stationary due to the presence of exogenous growth. However,
there exists a transformation of the economy a-la King et al (1987) that allows the application of
standard recursive solution methods. Let γ = γEγD. The paper will focus on a balanced growth

















Hence, we can redeﬁne the variables in question with respect this path. For simplicity, I continue
the discussion assuming that the economy is on this path.
Relative to the frontier, the productivity of a plant’s capital decreases at the rate of embodied
technological progress. This is broadly in line with the ﬁndings of Bahk and Gort (1993), in which
annual diﬀerences in average capital age are measured to correspond on average to decreases in
plant level productivity of several percentage points net of other factors.
Timing is as follows. At the beginning of each period, plants observe the value of zt and
produce. At the end of the period, they draw j ≤ J and decide whether or not to continue into
the following period. If they do not, they exit. If they do, then they also choose whether or not
to update their capital to a diﬀerent vintage.
Let W be the value function of the plant. Deﬁne also C as the plant’s continuation value at







0,U(zt) − φjpt,E zt+1W (τ +1 ,z t+1) − φjpt
ª
(1)


























Let Υ be the optimal updating rule and X be the plants’ optimal shut-down rule, deﬁned as
7follows:7
Υ(τ,zt) = arg max
y∈[0,1]









Υ(τ,zt)U (zt)+( 1− Υ(τ,zt))Ezt+1W (τ +1 ,z t) − φjpt
¤
3.1 The (S,s) Structure of Updating
The following statements characterize the structure of exit and updating in the steady state of
this economy. They will prove useful in deriving the equilibrium transition function G, and in
forming an algorithm to compute the steady state measure. In what follows I make a stochastic
dominance assumption about f that endows W and X with a number of intuitive properties, for
given w, p and G. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Condition 1 The process generated by f is stationary.
Condition 2
R Z
−∞ f(zt+1|zt)dzt+1 is weakly decreasing in zt∀Z.
Condition 1 is required for W to be ﬁnite, and is assumed throughout. Condition 2 delivers
monotonicity of closure and updating rules.
Lemma 1 The plant’s value function exists, is unique, is strictly decreasing and strictly convex
in plant age τ.
Lemma 2 Assume Condition 2 holds. Then W is strictly increasing in z.
Proposition 1 If a plant with individual state (τ,zt) updates, then one with (τ0,z t), τ0 >τ
does also.
Proposition 2 All updating is to the frontier.
These propositions can be proven, mutatis mutandis, for the distorted economy below. In
combination, Propositions 1 and 2 characterize the plant’s updating rule as being of the (S,s)
form, conditional on z and censored by the optimal exit rule - see Figure (??).
Proposition 3 Assume Condition 2 holds. If a plant of type (τ,zt) prefers to update, one of
type (τ,z0
t) does so too for z0
t >z t.
Proposition 4 T h ee x i tr u l ei si n c r e a s i n gi nτ, and decreasing in z.
Plant closures generally take place among the least productive. If productivity is low because
the plant is old but zt is high, it is likely to update rather than close. If the plant is young but
zt is low, however, it is more likely to close. Thus the model can accommodate a wide variety
of plant dynamics. For example, some leapfrogging may occur when plants update, but not
necessarily much.




















Deﬁnition A stationary equilibrium is a list of functions for plants W,C,U,Υ,X,n; for house-
holds H, c, e, m, h; aggregate functions E,w, p and a measure µ such that the following
conditions are satisﬁed:
i) plant optimality: W is the plant’s value function, yielding n, Υ and X as optimal decision
rules;
ii) Household optimality: H is the household’s value function, yielding c,e, m and h as
decision rules;8





iv) Labor market clearing: h =
R
n(τ,z;µ)dµ,w h e r en is the optimal labor input level for
the plant.














Υ(τ,z)dµ + Et = ζ (m)
vi) Consistency in entry: E = e;
vii) Stationarity of µ: µ = 1
νG(µ,E).
viii) Symmetry: µ =ˆ µ.
While an existence proof for this model is intractable, it is worth commenting on the subject.
Models with heterogeneous establishments generally require a condition on the income eﬀect
of labor supply to guarantee existence,9 and cannot necessarily guarantee that entry and exit
will exist in equilibrium. In this environment, if limm+→0 ζ
0 (m)=∞,t h e r emust be entry in
equilibrium. Some entry will always be proﬁtable, given that the continuation costs φj do not
have to be paid. To see this, observe that even if J =1and φ1 = ∞,a" ﬂy-by-night" equilibrium
in which plants operate for one period only could still exist. Also, given that γE > 1, for any w
there will be some exit even if φJ < ∞. Hence, any stationary equilibrium will have both entry
and exit in this environment.
4C a l i b r a t i o n
Period length is considered to be 1 year. There is extensive documentation of the fact that the
environment faced by young plants, particularly those younger than 5-10 years or so, is harsher
than that faced by older plants10.T h i s d i ﬀerence is captured parametrically by ψ. Under
Condition 2, plants that update will tend to have relatively high idiosyncratic shocks. Due to ψ,
and because unproductive plants quit, these will tend to be relatively old plants or plants that
have not recently updated.
The shocks z were taken over a grid of 30 points. Given a particular grid, multiplying it by
any factor aﬀects only the size and not the relative composition of the economy. I choose values
evenly spaced between zero and ﬁve.
8The condition on entry is simply that pζ
0 (m)=w.
9See Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).
10See Bahk and Gort (1993), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) and Evans (1987).
94.1 Functional forms
I must pick forms for the primitives of the model — namely, f the idiosyncratic shock process, ψ
the distribution of shocks across entrants, ζ the managerial production function and λ the utility
of leisure.
• f(.|.) is speciﬁed as an approximation to a ﬁrst order autoregressive stochastic process over
the grid of z values with normal disturbances: lnzt+1 =l n zt + εt+1, where εt˜N(0,σ2).
This form of f satisﬁes a stochastic dominance condition that yields monotonicity in the
exit rule with respect to z.
• ψ(.), the distribution over initial idiosyncratic shocks, is summarized by two parameters
that yield a piecewise linear distribution over the lower portion of the domain. ψ is uniform
from the lowest shock value until a certain point ψ1, after which it declines linearly until
it reaches zero at another point ψ2.
• ζ(.) is assumed to take the simple form11 ζ(m)=m
¯ ζ.
• I set L(lt)=−Λlt. This assumption is equivalent to the following structure.12 There is an
institutionally determined work week of length 1, so that all agents are either working time
1 or not working at all. Perfect unemployment insurance is available, and which agents
get to work is determined by a lottery. This is equivalent to picking a general function L
and setting Λ = L(ω) − L(ω − 1), and conveniently identiﬁes total labor input with total
employment.
4.2 Parameter values
Veracierto (2001) performs a carefull growth accounting analysis, reporting that post-war eco-
nomic growth per head in the US was about 1.56%. I must divide this into γE and γD. Greenwood
et al (1996) and Cummins and Violante (2002) both ﬁnd via diﬀerent methods that 60% of eco-
nomic growth can be attributed to increases in capital-embodied technical change. Hence I set
γE =( 1 .0156)
0.6 and γD =( 1 .0156)
0.4.




, so that establishments that are struck with the highest shock
will exit regardless of whatever policies are present. That φ2 = b φ<∞ implies that some shocks
are bad enough that some plants cannot weather them, whereas others can.
ν is set so that annual population growth is 1.2%. The discount factor is given by β =
γ
1+i,
set to be consistent with a 5.5% interest rate.13 The labor income share θ is set to 64%, also an
intermediate value among available measurements.
The disutility of labor Λ is chosen so that employment is 80%, which is approximately the
portion of the US working age population employed. I set ¯ ζ =0 .2, which leaves 6% of employment
in the managerial form. This is approximately the proportion of employment in Business Services
in the US National Income and Product Accounts. Results are insensitive to the choice of ¯ ζ.
11For a decision theoretic basis to this form, see Veracierto (2001).
12See Hansen (1986) and Rogerson (1988).
13Rates ranging from 4% to 7% are routinely used in the real business cycle literature. I pick 5.5% as an
intermediate value.
10The functional form for f is lnzt+1 =l nzt + εt+1, where εt˜N(0,σ2).
λ3 will determine the extent of closure that impacts all plants. Evans (1987) ﬁnds that
hazard rates are decreasing in plant age, ﬁnding a lowest quinquennial hazard rate of 8.3%
among establishments that are older than 95 years. However, the data set covers 1976 to 1982,
during which exit rates were higher than usual. Hence I choose λ3 so that this number is a little
l o w e r ,a b o u t6 % . T h ep r o p o r t i o no fc l o s u r ed u et os h o c k st h a ta r es m a l le n o u g ht h a ta tl e a s t
some establishments would be capable of surviving them is thus over 80%.
The remaining parameters are those that determine the dynamics of surviving plants and
the determinants of shut-downs. I identify them using data on labor ﬂows and cross-cohort size
diﬀerences, using an algorithm related to simulated annealing to match certain statistics of the
size-age distribution of plants.14 These seven parameters are b φ,λ2,ψ 1,ψ2,σ and κ,a n dt h es i x
statistics I match are:
1. The 5-year plant hazard rate
2. The 5-year hazard rate of plants aged 6 years or less
3. The proportion of employment that undergoes job creation in each year
4. The proportion of job creation due to birth
5. The proportion of job destruction due to exit
6. The average age of equipment
The rationale for matching these particular statistics is broadly as follows. ˆ φ and λ2 should
be closely related to the extent of shutdowns and to the magnitude of job turnover that they
account for. The size of the young and the amount of job turnover they generate are connected
the initial distribution of shocks, and hence to ψ1 and ψ2. σ aﬀects the amount of overall job
turnover — as of course does κ.F i n a l l y ,κ also determines incentives to update, and hence should

















Table 7 — Parameter values
Table (1) lists the resulting parameter values, and Table (2) displays several statistics that
characterize the model economy. The matches are quite tight. In particular, even though most
14On simulated annealing, see Bertesmas and Tsitsilkis (1993). Data are drawn from Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992), Dunne et al (1989), Evans (1987a) and the US National Income and Product Accounts.
11closures can be attributed to endogenous factors (i.e. to b φ), the diﬀerence in exit rates between
age groups is small, as in the data. I regard this as a success of the model in yielding realistic
plant level dynamics. That κ>1 is consistent with the notion that, in terms of opportunity
cost, young establishments may have an advantage over old ones when it comes to the adoption
of new technologies — see Faria (2003). I also report the proportion of young plants that are
"small" in that they are less than 33% of the average size: that match is not too far oﬀ the data
either.
Statistic US Data Model Economy
Exit 36% 36%
Exit, 0-6 40% 41%
Plants, 0-6, that are "small" 74% 80%
Job creation 10% 10%
J o bc r e a t i o nf r o mB i r t h 16% 17%
Job destruction from exit 23% 25%
Average age 7.2 7.8%
Table 8 — Matched statistics
Figure (1) displays the decision rules for the benchmark economy. Establishments are born
at some point on the y axis, depending on their initial draw from c. As they age, they move
towards the right deterministically, also moving up or down depending on the shock realizations.
If at any time while in the area labelled "conditional exit" they receive a draw from Φ of b φ,
then they optimally choose to exit. In any other region, they do not exit and simply pay the
continuation fee. If they receive a draw from Φ of ∞, then they exit unconditionally. Finally, if
they at any point enter the region labelled "Update" then they return to the y axis, with a new
shock value drawn from f (·|zt).
That continuation shocks are not persistent embodies the notion that there is such a thing as
a temporary downturn that is unrelated to the long term viability of the establishment. On the
other hand, setting φJ = ∞ captures the notion that organizations may fail for reasons that are
related to their long term viability. Subsidies only apply to establishments that maintain their
long term viability: in other words, only plants suﬀering from a b φ shock may beneﬁt.
5 Employment Protection
5.1 Diﬀusion and Employment Protection
In this section I examine the eﬀects of imposing a ﬁring tax in this economy. I do so by imposing
a ﬁring tax of τ years’ wages, that is redistributed lump-sum to the agents. In what follows I
report results for τ =1 .
Like related models, ﬁring costs decrease employment and steady state consumption, leading
to a loss of welfare. Job creation is suppressed and, interestingly, entry and exit become more



































Figure 1: Decision rules, benchmark economy.
important factors of job turnover. Plants are born and





Exit, 0-6 41% 41%
P l a n t s ,0 - 6 ,t h a ta r e" s m a l l " 80% 80%
Job creation 10% 4.5%
Job creation from Birth 17% 26%
Job destruction from exit 25% 48%
Average age 7.8% 8.0%
Table 9 — Employment Protection
Firing costs also slow the equilibrium rate of technical diﬀusion. This is seen in that the
average age of capital increases. Indeed, the entire vintage distribution is ﬂattened. If we
interpret IT as being associated with the more recent vintages of capital, this suggests that IT
will be less prevalent in countries where ﬁring costs are high.
5.2 IT and Employment Protection
Now I examine the eﬀect of an increase in γE. Greenwood et al (1997), Cummins and Violante
(2001) and Samaniego (2004b) ﬁnd that, since the mid 1970s, there has been both an acceleration
of embodied technical change and a deceleration of disembodied technical change. Samaniego














Figure 2: Vintage distribution, 60% embodied growth.














Figure 3: Vintage distribution, 100% embodied growth.
(2004b) ﬁnds that most productivity growth has been embodied since then, using data for both
equipment and structures. Using only data for equipment, Greenwood et al (1997) ﬁnd that it
has accounted for more than 100% of productivity growth, with disembodied technical change
falling over the period. Using a more detailed procedure, Cummins and Violante (2001) ﬁnd
that it has been entirely embodied.
I take a middle course and assume that the entirety of growth is embodied. This implies that
γE =1 .0156,γD =1 . I compare across steady states in order to focus on the long run eﬀects of
the change.
I ﬁnd, ﬁrst of all, that the long run eﬀect of this change is to increase employment. This
is regardless of whether or not ﬁring costs are present. However, this employment eﬀect is
dampened by dismissal costs. As a result, the employment gap between economies widens.
Observe that the average age of capital is more suppressed in the economy with ﬁring taxes
than before. Moreover, the employment eﬀect of ﬁr i n gc o s t si se x a c e r b a t e d .




































Figure 4: Employment, embodiment and dismissal costs. The independent variable is the pro-
portion of growth that is embodied.
5.3 Trend or Turbulence?
Is this the result of increasing variability in the optimal scale of operations, or of the fact that
the optimal scale tends to decrease more sharply over time?
To answer this question, I recalibrate the model economy for a variety of values of γE.T h i s
allows a comparison across economies that diﬀer in terms of γE, but with all the matched statistics
approximately the same, including the level of overall turnover. The question is, what are the
long run eﬀects of changing γE net of any other changes?15 This exercise has the additional
beneﬁt of demonstrating whether the rate of technical change is, in isolation from other factors,
suﬃcient to change the impact of dismissal costs.
I ﬁnd that the employment loss from the imposition of dismissal costs is increasing in γE
—s e eF i g u r e(4). This suggests that it is predominantly not the "turbulence" eﬀe c tt h a tl e a d s
to a suppression of employment after an increase in γE, but rather the "downward trend" in
productivity that this imposes.
In a related model, De Michelis (2003) proves that the severity of the employment eﬀects
of ﬁring costs is related to the relative likelihood of a downward productivity transition. He
interprets this as suggesting that ﬁring costs are more damaging in recessions.
While it may or may not be the case that this is a reasonable characterization of a recession,
the likelihood of a downward transition will be related to the rate at which establishments fall
behind the productivity frontier — i.e., it should depend on the rate of embodied technical change.
This precisely what I ﬁnd here.
Interestingly, Figure (5) shows that the decrease in the average age of capital decreases in γE.
A given change in the average age of capital is more costly when γE is high, due to accelerated
obsolescence. The economy responds optimally by minimizing changes to the age structure of
capital.
15Thus, γEγD remains constant across experiments. See appendix for parameter values and matched statistics.







































Figure 5: Average age and embodiment.
6D i s c u s s i o n
The model ﬁnds that an increase in the rate of embodied technical change is associated with a
widening of employment outcomes across countries, as a result of an interaction with EPL.
A prediction of the model is that newer technologies should be less prevalent in economies
in which employment protection is strict. In this section I present some evidence that there is a
relationship between IT penetration and employment protection. If one identiﬁes it with "newer
technologies", such evidence should be consistent with the model.16 I take as an assumption that
IT is related to an increase in the rate of embodied technical change: extensive aggregate and
industry-level evidence is provided in Gordon (1990) and Cummins and Violante (2001).
I use data for 20 OECD countries.17 As always, there are many problems with cross-country
policy regressions including the fact that empirical relationships could be spurious. I address
this by considering several IT penetration indices, as well as a number of policies that one might
expect to matter for IT.
As a measure of employment protection I use the broad index developed by Nicoletti et al
(2000), using 1998 data. This measure is predominantly composed of severance pay and advanced
notice requirements. I refer to it henceforth as EMP.
I use a variety of measures of IT drawn from Coppel (2000) and Pilat and Lee (2001). I use
two measures of the prevalence of e-commerce: the number of internet hosts and the number of
secure servers18 relative to the population. Secure servers are likely to be the stronger index, as
the internet has other non-commercial uses which will be related to the number of hosts, whereas
16Bartelsman and Hinloopen (2002) provide similar evidence, although they do not compare the inﬂuence of
diﬀerent policies.
17These countries (chosen on the basis of data availability) are: Austria (AUT), Australia (AUS), Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
18An internet host is any computer with full two-way access to the network and thus carries an IP address.
The density of secure servers is an indicator of the distribution of e-commerce across countries. Every computer
that contains websites is a server. See Coppel (2000).
16the primary use of secure servers is to transmit private such as credit card numbers. I also use
other more direct measures that are listed in Table (1).
Name Diﬀusion Index
HOST Internet size: Internet hosts per thousand inhabitants, 1999.
SERV E-commerce: Secure servers per million inhabitants, 2000.
PCS PC base: Average number of PCs per capita, 1999.
ITSP Share of ICT spending in GDP, 1992-1999.
ITEMP Share of ICT in business sector employment, 1998.
Table 1 — IT penetration measures
Table (2) and Figures (6) and (7) reveal a fairly striking negative relationship between IT








Table 2 — IT penetration measures
and EMP, correlations and signiﬁcance.
A problem with cross-country policy analysis is that results could be due to other policies
that are correlated with the policy of interest. Hence, I perform a number of simple regressions
including several additional policy variables.
Nicoletti et al (2000) provide indices of several policy indices. They come under two broad
categories: employment protection (EMP) and product market regulation (PRO). The main
components of EMP are dismissal costs and advance notice requirements, whereas PRO captures
general regulation including general state involvement in operations and in ownership, as well
as measures of market openness. I include these two indices as regressors. One might expect
PRO to be potentially related to IT in a number of ways, for instance via extra administrative
burdens.
I also include data for industrial subsidies (IND) and the costs of entry (ENT). Most industrial
support consists of transfers to ailing establishments, so these should constitute a potentially
important determinant of the decision to retire ageing plants, which could "crowd out" the new.19
O nt h eo p p o s i t em a r g i n ,t h ec o s to fe n t r ym i g h ta ﬀect the decision to establish new plants in
new industries. ENT is drawn from Djankov et al (2002), and takes account of corruption as
well as formal entry costs. Industrial support IND is the reported proportion of GDP spent on
industrial subsidies for 1971-1988, drawn from the OECD national accounts and reported in Ford
19See Samaniego (2003a).
17Figure 6: Employment Protection and Internet Hosts per 1000 inhabitants. Correlation: -60%.
Figure 7: Employment Protection and Secure servers per million inhabitants. Correlation: -82%.
18and Suyker (1989).20
Name Policy Index
EMP Broad employment protection measure
ENT Entry costs
IND Industrial Subsidy rates
PUB Extent of public ownership
PRO Product market regulation
TRA Barriers to International Trade and Investment
Table 3 — Policy variables
I include two further variables from the Nicoletti et al (2000) data set: TRA (barriers to
trade) and PUB (the extent of public ownership). Pressures from international trade are often
cited as an important reason for the closure of plants.21 The variable TRA should capture the
eﬀects of this channel, which may be distinct from those related to PRO. Indeed, this variable
turns out to be uncorrelated with PRO.
Ford and Suyker (1989) and Leonard and Van Audenrode (1997) point out that much in-
dustrial support is implicit through, for example, government ownership of companies. Hence,
national accounts data may miss certain forms of industrial support that might impact resource
reallocation. This is why I include PUB. PUB is the only policy variable that is correlated
with industrial subsidies, and may potentially be a good indicator of omitted industrial support.
Thus, both PUB and IND are included.
While industrial subsidy data is for the period 1970-1988, measurements for the other policies
were performed in the 1980s and 1990s. This is unlikely to inﬂuence results, however, as regu-
latory regimes are generally very stable. Nicoletti et al (2000) ﬁnd that EMP and PRO remain
almost unchanged between the 1980s and 1990s.
Variable ENT EMP IND PUB PRO TRA
ENT - +56 +25 +37 +45 -24
EMP +56 - +65 +66 +80 -26
IND +25 +65 - +85 +45 -16
PUB +37 +66 +85 - +69 -1
PRO +45 +80 +45 +69 - +18
TRA -24 -26 -19 -1 +18 -
Table 4 - Correlations among policy variables.
20Murphy and Pretschker (1996) include a few later years; however their series is shorter, not constructed in
the same manner, and not consistent across countries.
Ford and Suyker (1989) do provide data from other sources with a more comprensive view of industrial support.
I do not use this data because the panel is very unbalanced, so that the 20 year average for some countries is
the average over only one or two data points and may hence reﬂect transitory conditions rather than the overall
regulatory environment.
21See Ford and Suyker (1989), OECD (1996).
19Variable HOST SERV PCS ITSP ITEMP
HOST - +82 +90 +69 +43
SERV +82 - +84 +81 +31
PCS +90 +84 - +76 +39
ITSP +69 +81 +76 - +17
ITEMP +43 +31 +39 +17 -
T a b l e5-C o r r e l a t i o n sa m o n gI Tv a r i a b l e s .
Table (4) shows that many of these policy variables are indeed highly correlated amongst
themselves. This suggests that simple correlations between policy variables and outcome variables
should be interpreted with caution. Table (6) also shows strong correlations among many of the
IT indices, as would be expected from the results of Table (2).
Variable EMP ENT IND PUB PRO TRA Adj R2
HOST -55** -56*** -38* 76*** -13 0 62
-62*** -54*** -34** 68*** - - 66
SERV -74*** -30* -23 51** -22 2 72
-86*** -27* -16 38** - - 73
PCS -44 -50** -31 63** -24 7 46
-57** -49** -24 53** - - 51
ITSP -47* -39** -27 31 -30 9 62
-64*** -37** -18 17 - - 64
ITEMP -53 -23 -2 92** -1 -14 34
-51** -18 0 84*** - - 40
Table 6 — IT and policy. Dependent variables are on the
left-most column. Variables are normalized by mean and
standard deviation. All coeﬃcients are percentages.
An asterisk (*) denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level. Two
and three asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
Table (6) displays the results of regressions. I ran a regression with the full set of policy
variables, subsequently removing PRO and TRA as they seemed to matter little22 —w h i c hi s
perhaps surprising. The strongest relationships are clearly those with EMP, ENT and PUB.
PUB may be capturing state support for the underlying infrastructure. Barriers to entry ENT are
negatively related to IT penetration, which is not surprising since many information technology
industries are new. What is surprising is the robust negative relationship between IT penetration
and employment protection. Coeﬃcients are standardized, which implies that one standard
deviation of diﬀerence in employment protection is related to, for example, a recrease in the
number of secure servers of 3/4 of a standard deviation.
22Since the correlation between EMP and PRO, I repeated several regressions removing EMP instead of PRO.
Coeﬃcients on PRO were generally not signiﬁcant.
There is also the risk of colinearity between IND and PUB. Running regressions without IND generally left a
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on PUB, whereas the reverse often implied that IND was not signiﬁcant.
20I conclude that there is evidence of a negative relationship between IT and employment
protection, and that it is robust to the inclusion of other forms of regulation as alternatives. In
fact, the relationship is so strong that it suggests that additional eﬀects may be at work. For
example, if capital is internationally mobile, the eﬀects outlined in the model economy may result
in industries relocating across borders so that countries with in which EPL is weak will have a
comparative advantage in industries in which capital-embodied technical change is rapid.
6.1 Summary
The paper ﬁnds that an acceleration of the rate of embodied technical change can lead to a
decrease in employment at countries in which EPL is strong. Although such an acceleration
is associated with an increase in turbulence, it is not this eﬀect that leads to this employment
eﬀect: rather, it is because the optimal scale of operations decreases faster, so jobs are shorter-
lived in expectation. Moreover, I ﬁnd that EPL can slow the diﬀusion of new technologies.
An interesting extension would be to study the transition between a regime in which embodied
technical change is slow to one that is faster. During transition, many establishments may ﬁnd
themselves unsustainably large, — having hired previously with the expectation of relatively long-
lived jobs. As a result, they might be more reluctant to ﬁre in an environment in which EPL is
strict, leading to medium-term labor market dynamics that could involve a further divergence
between countries with regulatory regimes.
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22AP r o p o s i t i o n s a n d P r o o f s
Proofs all employ standard recursive methods. Let v be a uniformly continuous function and let
B be the Bellman operator. W is the ﬁxed point v : Bv = v,i fa n y ,o f
C (j,τ,zt;v)=m a x
©
0,U(zt;v) − φjpt,E zt+1v(τ +1 ,z t+1) − φjpt
ª
(4)
























Let Υ be the optimal updating rule and X be the plants’ optimal exit rule. Then,
Υ(τ,zt;v)=a r g m a x
y∈[0,1]
yU (zt;v)+( 1− y)Ezt+1v(τ +1 ,z t)




Υ(τ,zt)U (zt;v)+( 1− Υ(τ,zt))Ezt+1v(τ +1 ,z t+1) − φjpt
¤
Assume that w and p are positive and ﬁnite.
Lemma 1 W exists, is unique, is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in plant age τ.
Proof It is straightforward to show that the recursive system described above satisﬁes Black-
well’s suﬃcient conditions for being the unique ﬁxed point of the Bellman operator deﬁned
over the appropriate function. By the contraction mapping theorem, for any Ω that is
compact under the uniform norm, if ω ∈ Ω and Bv ∈ Ω then W ∈ Ω. This applies to
the claim that W is weakly decreasing, as well as to the claim of convexity.23 In addition,
considering an open set Ω ⊂ Ω, if Bv ∈ Ω for any v ∈ Ω/Ω (which is closed), then W ∈ Ω
(as the limit cannot be in Ω/Ω) This applies to the claims of strictness.
Lemma 2 Assume that Condition 2 holds. W is strictly increasing in z.
Proof Assume that v is increasing in z. Then, Ezt+1v(·,z t) —t h ev a l u eo fnot updating — is
increasing in z also — as is U — because f (·|z) is increasing in z. Consequently, Bv is
also, as the instantaneous payoﬀ is strictly increasing in z. Arguments identical to those
in Lemma 1 yield strictness.
Proposition 1 If a plant with individual state (τ,z) updates, then one with (τ0,z), τ0 >τdoes
also.
Proof Observe that U does not depend on τ. Hence, since the alternative to updating is
decreasing in τ, the updating rule must be increasing.
Proposition 2 All updating is to the frontier.
23Consider v decreasing in τ. Then, U and C are either constant in or decreasing in τ,a si st h er e s to fBv.T h e
same applies to the claim of convexity, since the supremum of any set of convex functions must itself be convex.
23Proof Rewrite the Bellman equation with a change of variables x ≡ γ
−τ
E .
˜ C (j,x,zt;v)=m a x
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This deﬁn e sac o n t r a c t i o na sb e f o r e .L e t ˜ W be the ﬁx e dp o i n t .I ti se a s i l ys h o w nt h a tt h e
ﬁxed point is increasing and convex in x,s i n c e 1
1−θ > 1.T h u s ,
R ˜ W(x0,e z)df (e z|z)de z − κx0






0,e z)df (e z|z)de z − κx
0





0,e z)df (e z|z)de z − κx
0 =
Z




−1,e z)df (e z|z)de z ∀x>0
so that inertia is always more proﬁtable than reversion to x =0(equivalent to τ = ∞)
and the result follows. Observe that this last argument also proves that plants will never
"downgrade" their capital.
Proposition 3 If a plant of type (τ,z) prefers to update, one of type (τ,z0) does so too for
z0 >z .
Proof Let ∆(τ,zt)=U (zt) − Ez+1W (τ,zt+1).T h e n
∆(zt)=EW (0,z t) − EW (τ,zt) − κp
= EF (0,z t) − EF (τ,zt)+
γ
1+i

























0,∆(zt) − φjpt + Ezt+1W (τ +1 ,z t+1),
Ezt+1W (τ +1 ,z t+1) − φjpt
¾¾
Taking W as given, this expression can be rewritten for ∆ in the form of equation (6) to deﬁne
a contraction that satisﬁes Blackwell’s conditions and which can be shown to be increasing
in z because both W and the static labor maximization problem are.
Proposition 4 The exit rules are increasing in τ, and decreasing in z.
Proof This result stems directly from the monotonicity results in Lemmata 1 and 2.
24BC o m p u t i n g µ
In a steady state, it must be that the entry rate, exit rules and updating rules are the same in























(1 − X(φk,τ,z t))Υ(τ,z)µt(τ,zt)f(e z|zt)
where Θ×Z is any subset of the idiosyncratic state space and 1(.) is a function that equals one
if the argument is true and zero if not. In a stationary equilibrium, X,Υ and E will be constant,
and µ will be the ﬁxed point of this functional.




1(Θ × Z)=E1(0 ∈ Θ)ψ
1(Z)
where ψ
1 = ψ. This is the measure if all plants die after one period. Let µ1
2 be the measure
computed according to X and Υ on the assumption that all updating results in death and that
all plants die after 2 periods. Similarly, deﬁne µ1
i.D e ﬁne µ1 = limi→∞ µ1
i. If there is no updating,
this is the steady state measure consistent with X and Υ. Otherwise, deﬁne ψ
j+1 to be the mass





















1(Θ × Z)=E1(0 ∈ Θ)ψ
j(Z)
ψ
j+1 — which is the distribution of establishments in µ1 who are using the most recent technology







i=0 for any j.D e ﬁne µj =l i m i→∞ µ
j
i. The steady state measure will
be µ ≡ limj→∞ µj.As u ﬃcient condition for the existence and ﬁnitude of µ is that φJ = ∞ and
λJ > 0 (in words, that in any given period there is a positive probability that establishments
will close regardless of type).
The advantage of using a discretized state space, as I do, is that this algorithm is easy to
implement and fast to run (on a Pentium III it takes a few seconds). µ can be approximated
to any desired degree of precision by computing µ
j
i for suﬃciently large values of i and j.I n
practice I use i = j = T. Usefully, employing this algorithm for i = j = T0 <Tis equivalent to
tracking the activities of all establishments that are younger than T0, making it simple to keep
track of individual cohorts in spite of the fact that updating means that τ does not necessarily
equal establishment age.
25CV a r y i n g γE
In this section I discuss the parameters and summary statistics for a variety of values of γE.T h e
values of γE that I examine cover between 30% and 100% of economic growth. I do not examine
values below 30% because their match of the average age of capital was not good.
Embodiment 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
κ 2.72 2.75 2.80 2.57 2.33 2.17 2.06 1.95
ψ1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
ψ2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
σ 0.078 0.077 0.076 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.073 0.073
λ2 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086
λ3 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014
b φ 4.70 4.32 3.99 3.55 3.38 3.14 3.09 3.07
Λ 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.087
Table A1 — Parameters. The percentage of embodiment represents the
proportion of growth that is attributed to capital-embodied technical change.
Table (A1) displays the parameters that varied across economies that also diﬀe r r e di nt e r m s
of γE. It can be observed that Λ is increasing in γE,w h e r e a sσ, b φ and κ are decreasing. Other
parameters do not vary signiﬁcantly across economies.
Embodiment 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Exit 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 35% 35% 36
Exit, 0-6 40% 40% 41% 41% 41% 40% 41% 41%
Plants, 0-6, that are "small" 77% 80% 75% 80% 82% 84% 81% 81%
Job creation 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Job creation from Birth 16% 16% 16% 17% 17% 16% 17% 18%
Job destruction from exit 22% 25% 25% 25% 24% 22% 23% 23%
Average age 8.3% 8.1% 8.0% 7.8% 7.6% 7.5% 7.4% 7.3%
Table A2 — Parameters. The percentage of embodiment represents the
proportion of growth that is attributed to capital-embodied technical change.
Table (A2) sets out the summary statistics used in calibration for each economy. Two obser-
vations should be made. First, the rate of job turnover is increasing in γE. Second, the average
age is decreasing in γE. In isolation each of these factors is understandable. *** However, the
whole point is to get around this. Hence the second exercise. Report results for that also.
26